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Abstract:  
During the transition toward a market economy, Russian workers have had to face 
important structural changes in the labour market as well as dramatic changes in 
their real earnings. In the process, the wage gap between men and women has 
varied wildly over that period. In recent years, young women have embraced 
professional careers, are more mobile on the labour market, and tend to delay the 
birth of their first child. 
 
All these trends are likely to influence intra-household relations and consequently the 
family decision process. To investigate this matter, we estimate a household 
collective labour supply model. We generalize the specification so as to allow the 
sharing rule to change in a discrete manner between the pre and post 1998 financial 
crisis periods. The parameters of the sharing-rule indicate that the households have 
shifted to a new equilibrium in the post-1998 period. Indeed, husbands have become 
more egotistic and wives more altruistic: an increase in their relative wage translates 
into a smaller/larger transfer to their spouse. 
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1 Introduction
The Russian economy has witnessed dramatic changes over the course of the
last 15–20 years. During the transition toward a market economy, workers have
had to face important decreases in their real earnings as well as widespread
unemployment. Indeed, Thomas and Stillman (2004) report that in the last
half of 1998 alone, real GDP collapsed by as much as 30%. The collapse can
be traced back to the price liberalization of January 1992 and a to series of
sweeping economic reforms. These included the elimination of most food and
fuel subsidies, the use of freely fluctuating market prices and the privatiza-
tion of many state enterprises. According to the United Nations (1998), the
economic downfall that culminated with the 1998 financial crisis can be in-
timately linked to structural and institutional deficiencies. Indeed, no safety
nets were in place to prevent households from falling into poverty [Lokshin
and Ravallion (2000)]. Furthermore, wage arrears and in-kind payments be-
came widespread practice by private firms and public institutions alike, thus
increasing income uncertainty [Grogan (2006), Mroz and Popkin (1995), Gerry,
Li and Kim (2004)]. For the majority of Russians, the impact of the 1988 crisis
was disastrous. The debacle of commercial banks deprived many households of
their hard earned savings during the soviet period and seriously undermined
their confidence vis-a`-vis financial institutions.
Many reckon that women have suffered more than men from the economic
collapse [Glinskaya and Mroz (2000)]. Indeed, as old enterprises closed down
while others faced increased competition, centrally set wages gave way to remu-
neration based on marginal productivity. 1 Because women were traditionally
over-represented in low-paid jobs, market forces may have depressed their rel-
ative wages further. Households thus needed to find strategies to deal with
unexpected income fluctuations and to maintain a minimum level of consump-
tion. Using data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS),
Lokshin and Yemtsov (2001) have found that in many cases women turned
to informal social networks and to government organizations for help. Women
were also more likely than men to reduce expenditures on food and cloth-
ing. Asymmetric gender responses may partly be explained by the fact that
Natalia.Radtchenko@malix.univ-paris1.fr (Natalia Radtchenko).
1 Within three years, from 1992 to 1995, the proportion of workers employed in
private enterprises rose from 5% to 38%.
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women are better informed about the household budget and market prices,
but it is also compatible with men having a greater say with respect to the
intra-household allocation of resources.
Enduring economic hardship and fundamental structural changes may have
induced the labour market to shift to a new equilibrium. Behavioural changes,
in return, can induce changes in social norms which modify the role of part-
ners within the households. During the communist period, great emphasis
was placed on employment both as a right and a duty equally for men and
women. However, society remained predominantly patriarchal and gender re-
lations within the household continued to reflect a strong “male breadwinner”
model [Paci (2002), Glinskaya and Mroz (2000)]. In recent years, women’s be-
haviour on the labour market has witnessed important changes: on the one
hand, a significant proportion of women have withdrawn from the working
force to become housewives. On the other hand, young women appear to be
more active than older women. They are more inclined to embrace professional
careers, are more mobile on the labour market, and tend to delay the birth of
their first child. Finally, Ashwin (2004) has underlined the fact that the tradi-
tional role of “breadwinner” can seriously be compromised if the male spouse is
unable to secure a high wage, often the cause of his domestic marginalisation.
All these trends inevitably influence intra-household relations and consequently
the decision process. Thus behavioral changes on the labour market may re-
flect not only gender-biased labour markets adjustments, but also changing
bargaining power within households. 2 Assessing the extent to which observed
behavioural changes are driven by changing intra-household bargaining power
is a difficult task. Yet the wild fluctuations in the wage rates over much of
the 1990s and the important changes in the labour market participation rates
offer a unique opportunity to investigate the inner functioning of the Russian
households. To achieve this, one must be willing to assume that the observed
household outcomes are Pareto-efficient (“collectively rational”). If one focuses
exclusively on the labour supply behaviour, Chiappori(1988, 1992) has shown
that it is possible to recover (up to a constant) the so-called income sharing-
rule that supports the observed outcomes. This result is particularly useful in
2 Gerry et al. (2004) provide evidence that the wage gap is unevenly distributed,
with women at the lower end of the distribution suffering most. Their results show
that managers very likely used wage arrears and in-kind payments to attenuate the
wage gap at the bottom end of the wage distribution.
3
our context. Indeed, the dramatic changes that have occurred in the relative
wage rates during the 1990s are bound to have impacted the sharing-rule be-
tween spouses. We thus seek to investigate this issue through the estimation
of a household collective labour supply model. Such models have been widely
used in the recent empirical literature. In the majority of cases, though, the
analyses have focused exclusively on households in which both spouses par-
ticipate on the labour market [e.g.,Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002)]. In
addition to potential selection biases and efficiency loss, focusing exclusively
on interior solutions leaves out an important margin of adjustment.
Our strategy consists in estimating a labour supply model that allows for
corner solutions for both husbands and wives. The model is inspired from
Bloemem (2008). We generalize the specification so as to allow the sharing
rule to change in a discrete manner between the pre and post 1998 periods.
The parameter estimates associated with the structural shift can be directly
interpreted as a change in the bargaining power within households. The wage
rates and the labour supply functions are estimated simultaneously. We also
account for non-parametric unobserved heterogeneity both in the wage and
labour supply equations.
On the whole, the behaviour of Russian households can be relatively well
approximated by the collective model. 3 The parameters of the sharing-rule
indicate that the households have shifted to a new equilibrium in the post-1998
economic crisis. Indeed, husbands have become more egoistic and wives more
altruistic: An increase in their relative wage translates into a smaller/larger
transfer to their spouse.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the data and
discusses the main features of the 1998 financial crisis in Russia and stresses
the manner in which it may have impacted intrahousehold bargaining power.
In Section 3 we present the household collective labour supply model and
indicate how the sharing rule can made period-specific. The econometric and
statistical specifications are presented in section 4. Finally, Section 5 discusses
the main empirical results.
3 Recently, Vermeulen, Cherchye, Rock and Sabbe (2005, 2008) have used consump-
tion data from the RLMS to test the collective model using non-parametric (Integer
Programming) tests. Their results indicate the the collective model is compatible
with the data.
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2 Data and Institutional Environment
The data we use are drawn from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey.
The RLMS is a household-based representative survey of Russia designed to
measure the effects of the reforms implemented through the 1990s on the
economic well-being of households and individuals. The data collection project
started in 1992 and currently holds as many as 13 waves of data (1992–2004). 4
Data collection was held in two distinct phases. Phase I covers the years 1992–
1994 while Phase II covers the period from 1994 (October) until 2004. Because
Phases I and II data do not perfectly overlap we focus exclusively on phase II
data. The collection schedule is reported in Table 1. Unfortunately, no data
were collected in the years prior to and following the 1998 financial crisis.
Table 1
Collection schedule of the RLMS data, Phase II
Round V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII
Year 1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of individuals: 8700
Our sample is composed of intact couples in which wives and husbands are
aged between 16 and 55 and 16 and 60, respectively. We exclude full-time
students as well as those who are unable to work for health reasons, women
on maternity leave, and finally those who are involuntarily unemployed (i.e.
unemployed and looking for a job). The latter are excluded to insure that non-
employment is a choice rather than a constraint.
2.1 The Evolving Labour Market
As mentioned earlier, the sweeping reforms that were introduced in the 1990s
up until the major financial crisis of 1998 have probably triggered changes in
the institutional environment and social norms that may be reflected in the
4 All the information on the RLMS data may be found on the project’s web page:
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms.
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labour market behaviour of spouses. Prima facie evidence on the changing
labour market adjustments is provided in Figure 1. The figure depicts the
participation rates of male and female spouses for the years 1994-2004 as well
as the husbands/wives wage ratio. Between 1994 and 1996, husbands have
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Fig. 1. Participation rates, relative wages
witnessed a decline of 10 percentage points in their participation rates. The
decline was much less pronounced for wives (3 percentage points) over the same
period. Husbands’ participation rates remained relatively constant between
1996 and 1998. In the following years, their participation rates have almost
returned to their 1994 level. Wives’ participation rate have followed an upward
trend between 1996 and 2002. After a small decline in 2003, their participation
rates in 2004 are slightly above those of 1994.
The dotted line in the figure depicts the relative (husband/wife) hourly (log)
wage ratios. 5 The scale of the dotted line appears on the right-hand side of
5 The period 1994-2004 was plagued by very high inflation. During the transition
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the figure. Prior to the crisis, wives’ wage rates amounted to more or less 90%
of their husbands’ wage rates but were declining slowly. During the crisis, wage
rates decreased dramatically. The decrease of men’s wages was much stronger
than that of women. Consequently, wives’ wage rates nearly doubled those of
their husbands in 1998. Some have suggested that this is partly explained by
the collapse of the high-wage sectors that were traditionally reserved to men
[see Goskomstat Rossii (1999), Bobyleva (2001)].
These trends are also confirmed by simple regression analyses. Table 2 reports
the results of regressing the (log) ratio of husband/wife wage rates on a series
of exogenous variables. These include each spouse’s age and schooling, and a
series of regional and year dummy variables. According to the parameter esti-
mates, the wage gap decreases with the husbands age and his wife’s schooling
level, but increases with his own level of schooling. Households living in the
Volga region have larger wage gaps than those living Eastern Siberia/Far East
region, while the converse holds for those living in Western Siberia. The year
dummy variables are consistent with the pattern depicted in Figure 1. Relative
to 1998, the (log) wage gap varies between 23% and 30% in the years 1994–
1996, decreases significantly in 1998, and increases steadily between 2000 and
2004. 6
Table 3 reports the parameter estimates of pooled probit regressions on par-
ticipation for each spouse separately. These regressions are only intended to
confirm or invalidate the trends observed in Figure 1. In both cases, age and
education are important determinants of labour force participation. Likewise,
most regional dummy variables are statistically significant. Interestingly, wives
living in the Moscow-St-Petersberg regions are no more likely to work than
those living in Eastern Siberia, while husbands are more likely to work than
in any other part of the country. Once again, the year dummy variable are
consistent with the pattern depicted in Figure 1: Wives’ participation rates
decline slowly at first, flatten out between 1996 and 2000, and by 2004 are
more or less equal to their pre-1998 level. Husbands’ participation rates are
phase sellers would post prices in “units” that needed to be translated into roubles
using the Rouble/US $ exchange rate. We thus convert the wage rates into US$
using the official exchange rates [see Goskomstat Rossii (2005)].
6 Glinskaya and Mroz (2000) report very similar wage gaps for the years 1992–1995
using RMLS data. See also Gerry et al. (2004) for a detailed analysis of the gender
wage gap for the years 1994–1998.
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Table 2
Wage Regression: ln(Wm/Wf )
Variable Para. Std. T-stat
Individual characteristics
Intercept -0.58 0.16 -3.61
Age - Husband -0.01 0.00 -5.10
Age - Wife 0.00 0.00 0.48
Schooling - Husband 0.02 0.01 2.72
Schooling - Wife -0.02 0.01 -2.26
Region of residence
Moscow - St-Petersberg -0.03 0.09 -0.35
North /Northwestern 0.18 0.11 1.65
Central / Black Sea 0.14 0.08 1.72
Volga/Viask/Volga Basin 0.17 0.09 2.05
North Caucus 0.07 0.10 0.70
Ural 0.02 0.09 0.21
Western Siberia -0.23 0.10 -2.23
Eastern Siberia omitted
Year dummies
1994 1.30 0.09 14.60
1995 1.23 0.11 11.43
1996 1.20 0.09 13.14
1998 omitted
2000 0.70 0.08 8.29
2001 1.22 0.09 14.09
2002 1.36 0.08 16.01
2003 1.60 0.08 19.00
2004 1.77 0.08 21.09
# Observations 3 083
R2 17.7%
also well captured by the year dummy variables. The sharp decline is well cap-
tured by the parameter estimates of 1994–2000 and the upward trend is also
nicely captured by the 2001–2004 year dummies.
As a last piece of evidence, Table 4 reports the results of fitting a pooled
tobit model on the weekly hours of work using the same specification as in
the probit regressions. Once again, age and schooling appear to be important
determinants of the weekly hours of work and exhibit the usual concave shape.
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Table 3
Pooled Probit Regressions: Participation
Wives Husbands
Variable Para. T-stat Para. T-stat
Individual characteristics
Intercept -5.33 -24.20 -1.00 -4.82
Age 0.21 23.11 0.08 9.11
Age2 0.00 -20.65 0.00 -10.94
Schooling 0.17 7.67 0.04 2.07
Schooling2 0.00 -5.25 0.00 -0.51
Region of residence
Moscow - St-Petersberg 0.01 0.18 0.13 2.54
North /Northwestern 0.10 1.80 -0.05 -0.83
Central / Black Sea 0.10 2.28 -0.02 -0.44
Volga/Viask/Volga Basin 0.13 2.92 -0.11 -2.57
North Caucus -0.24 -5.20 -0.20 -4.23
Ural 0.11 2.49 -0.02 -0.43
Western Siberia 0.05 0.96 -0.06 -1.25
Eastern Siberia Omitted Omitted
Year dummies
1994 0.14 3.19 0.34 7.72
1995 0.10 2.15 0.23 4.84
1996 0.01 0.29 0.05 1.03
1998 Omitted Omitted
2000 0.02 0.46 0.10 2.26
2001 0.15 3.23 0.09 2.03
2002 0.18 3.76 0.17 3.63
2003 0.11 2.28 0.17 3.67
2004 0.15 3.20 0.26 5.39
# Observations 14 235 15 275
log-likelihood -8534.231 -8157.0404
According to the parameter estimates, the typical number of weekly hours of
work varies significantly between regions. In particular, women in the Moscow-
St-Petersberg regions work fewer hours than those living in the Eastern Siberia
region. According to the year dummy variables, women appear to have had a
fairly stable workweek over the 1994-2004 period despite the major economic
downturn of 1998. Men, on the other hand, have had shorter workweeks during
that period but have since returned to their pre-crisis level.
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Table 4
Pooled Tobit Regressions: Weekly hours of Work
Wives Husbands
Variable Para. T-stat Para. T-stat
Individual characteristics
Intercept -24.59 -6.07 29.42 8.50
Age 2.20 13.27 0.56 3.99
Age2 -0.02 -11.24 -0.01 -4.52
Schooling 1.52 3.88 0.53 1.59
Schooling2 -0.04 -3.08 -0.01 -0.85
Region of residence
Moscow - St-Petersberg -2.69 -3.30 -0.17 -0.22
North /Northwestern 0.86 0.94 -0.62 -0.71
Central / Black Sea -0.10 -0.14 -1.90 -2.70
Volga/Viask/Volga Basin 1.51 2.06 -1.54 -2.18
North Caucus -3.93 -4.95 -2.14 -2.82
Ural -0.19 -0.26 -3.76 -5.20
Western Siberia -0.97 -1.17 0.98 1.23
Eastern Siberia Omitted Omitted
Year dummies
1994 2.78 3.83 -0.22 -0.31
1995 0.95 1.18 2.70 3.47
1996 0.57 0.69 2.42 3.03
1998 Omitted Omitted
2000 1.05 1.38 2.10 2.80
2001 1.33 1.73 2.00 2.61
2002 1.41 1.83 2.25 2.97
2003 2.25 2.88 3.03 3.96
2004 1.26 1.61 2.14 2.81
σ 18.29 133.48 19.45 151.92
# Observations 10 017 11841
log-likelihood -41 126.77 -51 159.15
All in all, the patterns depicted in Figure 1 are fairly robust. These show that
the wives’ wage rates have decreased significantly relative to their husbands’
wage rates starting with the financial crisis of 1998. Yet despite this their
participation rates and their workweek have remained relatively stable. 7 It
7 The stability of the wage and participation equations has been investigated thor-
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is thus likely that the wives’ share of household income has decreased signif-
icantly over that period. Such important changes may very well impact the
distribution of welfare within the households. Each year the RLMS investigates
this issue in a qualitative manner. Spouses are asked to report their subjective
“satisfaction level” with their economic conditions. Table 5 reports the figures
for the years 2000 and 2004. Year 2000 coincides with the end of the economic
downturn while 2004 corresponds to a period of relative growth. Responses
are graduated from 1 to 5, with 1 corresponding to the highest level of satis-
faction and 5 to the lowest. Interestingly, couples in our sample report being
very unsatisfied with their economic conditions in the year 2000. Indeed, both
spouses consistently report being “less than satisfied” or “Not at all satisfied”.
In 2004, by contrast, the majority of wives still report being unsatisfied while
most husbands report being relatively satisfied.
Obviously, being satisfied or unsatisfied with one’s economic conditions does
not imply a gain or a loss of welfare. One may be unsatisfied with one’s con-
ditions but still benefit from intrahousehold transfers from his/her spouse.
The regressions above and the available qualitative information nevertheless
do suggest that spouses have had to adapt their behaviour to a changing eco-
nomic environment. These changes inevitably influence intra-family relations
and consequently the decision process. The behavioural adjustments may re-
flect not only gender-biased crisis effects, but also a new equilibrium bar-
gaining power within households. Assuming Russian households behave in a
Pareto-efficient manner, it is possible to investigate how the labour market
adjustments affect the intra-household allocation of welfare.
3 Collective Model with Corner Solutions
As mentioned previously, changes in intrahousehold bargaining power can be
ascertained from examining the labour market behaviour of both spouses as-
oughly by Radtchenko (2006) based on regressions similar to those reported in Tables
2 and 3. She finds that the participation equations are stable over the 1994–1996
and 1998-2004 periods, but that the parameter estimates are distinct between the
two periods. On the other hand, there does not appear to be any structural break
in the wage equations of both husbands and wives.
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Table 5
Satisfaction Level with Economic Conditions†
2000 2004
Wives Wives
Husbands 1 2 3 4 5 Total 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 3 6 5 7 4 25 4 7 9 9 4 33
2 5 57 18 38 21 139 9 117 67 102 2 606 2 901
3 5 47 73 84 43 252 6 58 110 165 89 428
4 7 59 102 344 172 684 12 74 117 375 227 805
5 4 29 56 198 2 860 3 147 8 37 44 174 250 513
Total 24 198 254 671 3 100 4 247 39 293 347 825 3 176 4 680
†The scale is constructed as follows: 1 – Fully satisfied, 2 – Rather satisfied, 3 – Mildly
satisfied, 4 – Less than satisfied, 5 – Not at all satisfied.
suming the outcomes are Pareto-efficient. 8 In what follows, we describe a
collective model that allows for corner solutions by both spouses [see Donni
(2003), Bloemem (2008)]. The model is generalised to allow the sharing-rule
to vary between the pre and the post 1998 period. 9
3.1 The General Model
Consider a household composed of two individuals denoted j with j = f for
female and j = m for male. We assume there are only two decision-makers,
although we allow the presence of children and relatives (elderly). 10 Each
8 See the aforementioned papers by Vermeulen, Cherchye, Rock and Sabbe who
find support for the collective model using RLMS consumption data.
9 We do not allow the sharing-rule to vary yearly to avoid over-parameterizing
the model. Furthermore, we do not account for home production for two separate
reasons. First, time-use data is no longer available as of round IX of the RLMS.
Second, as shown by Donni (2004) and Chiappori (1997), if one is willing to assume
that the home production function is additively separable, then the collective model
is valid even if home production is not explicitly taken explicitly into account.
10 The presence of elderly parents is frequent in Russian households. We acknowl-
edge that elderly parents and grown-up children may influence the decision-making
process [see, e.g., Fortin, Dauphin, El Lhaga and Lacroix (2008)]. We omit this pos-
sibility in order to keep the model tractable. Indeed, most analyses of the collective
model with multiple decision-makers focus on consumption data to avoid corner
solutions. See Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori and Ekeland (2006).
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has his own standard utility function that depends on leisure (assignable and
observed), Lj, and a Hicksian composite good (unobserved), Cj. Prices are
normalized to 1. In the collective model, the decision process is assumed to
yield Pareto-efficient solutions to the household resource allocation problem.
Consumption is decentralized by the appropriate choice of full-income shares
Φj derived from the bargaining process.
The maximization program can thus be formulated as: 11
Max
Cjt,hjt
Ujt(hjt, Cjt), j = f,m such that (1)
Cft + wftLft≤Φft
Cmt + wmtLmt≤Φmt
Ljt + hjt = T,
Φft = Φt(wft, wmt, yft, ymt, pft, pmt)
Φmt =wftT + wmtT + yft + ymt − Φft,
where t indicates the year, t = D corresponds to the financial crisis (year
1998), pjt describes the participation statuses at time t, wjt are the hourly
wage rates, hjt are the labour supply functions, and yft and ymt are female
and male non-labour income.
The solution of the program yields:
hft =h
f
t [wft,Φft(wft, wmt, yft, ymt, pft, pmt)] (2)
hmt =h
m
t [wmt,Φmt(wft, wmt, yft, ymt, pft, pmt)].
To avoid addressing the issue of corner solutions, most empirical papers based
on the collective model have so far limited their samples to working couples [see
e.g. Chiappori et al. (2002)]. Donni (2003) proposes an innovative approach
for taking into account corner solutions. He assumes that the household labour
11 We index the variables in the maximization problem by t to highlight the fact that
we use panel data when estimating the model. We remove them in the remainder of
the section to ease reading.
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supply functions are continuous in the neighbourhood of a so-called partici-
pation frontier. Along this frontier each household member is indifferent to
the participation status of his/her spouse. Donni (2003) shows that under this
assumption both the preferences and the sharing rule are identified up to a
constant as in Chiappori(1988, 1992).
To fix ideas, let
ωj(wf , wm, y) ≡ U
j
H(T,Cj(wf , wm, y))
U jC(T,Cj(wf , wm, y))
be the reservation wage of spouse j, where U jH and U
j
C are the partial deriva-
tives of the utility function with respect to working hours and consumption,
and y is the total household non-labour income. This function describes the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption calculated at
L = 0 (H = T ). Thus the reservation wage of spouse j is implicitly defined
as a function of non-labour income and his or her partner’s wage. In order to
guarantee the uniqueness of the reservation wages, Donni (2003) assumes that
the preferences and the sharing rule are such that for each (w∗f , w
∗
m, y) and
(w′f , w
′
m, y) the following condition holds:
max
j=f,m
(∣∣∣ωj(w∗f , wm∗, y)− ωj(w′f , w′m, y)∣∣∣) ≤ max
j=f,m
(∣∣∣w∗j − w′j∣∣∣) . (3)
This condition is implicitly equivalent to assuming that the wage effects on the
shares of each spouse not be “too large”. 12 The condition in (3) implies two
important results [Donni (2003), Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and Meghir
(2007)]. First, the mapping between [ωm(·), ωf (·)] and (wf , wm) is unique.
There thus exists a single pair of wages such that both spouses are indifferent
between working or not. Second, for each spouse j, there exists a function
γj(ws, y) that completely characterizes participation:
pj =
 1 if and only if wj > γ
j(ws, y)
0 if and only if wj ≤ γj(ws, y), j, s = f,m, j 6= s.
(4)
12 The work of Kalugina, Radtchenko and Sofer (2007) and Radtchenko (2006) pro-
vide some support for this assumption.
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The intuition behind this result is the following. In the case were both husband
and wife work, the first and second order derivatives of the labour supply
functions in (2) generate a set of partial differential equations that can be
solved to identify the sharing-rule up to an additive constant. Donni (2003)
has shown that if only one spouse works, then the set of partial differential
equations is also satisfied as wi → γj(·). Thus the participation frontier, γj(·),
serves as a boundary condition for the system of differential equations.
3.2 The Labour Supply Model
Let cD = (αmD, αfD, βmD, βfD, γmD, γfD, qmD, qfD, qfmD) be the vector of “struc-
tural” parameters. Let D index the structural parameters before (D = 0) and
after the 1998 crisis (D = 1 ). Thus cD = c0 + c1D with c0 = (αm0 , αf0 , βm0 ,
βf0 , γm0 , γf0 , qf0, qm0, qfm0) and c1 = (αm1 , αf1 , βm1 , βf1 , γm1 , γf1 , qf1 , qm1 , qfm1).
Male and female individual characteristics are denotedXm andXf while house-
hold characteristics are denoted Xfm.
The labour supply functions are assumed log-linear, i.e.
h∗m =αmD ln(wm) + βmD ln(wm)
2 + γmD ln(Φm) + qmD (5)
h∗f =αfD ln(wf ) + βfD ln(wf )
2 + γfD ln(Φf ) + qfD, (6)
where qmD and qfD include individual and household characteristics, i.e.
qmD =mDXm + qfmDX(fm) + cmD
qfD = fDXm + qfmDX(fm) + cfD.
Denote ∆ = Φm−Φf .Given the budget constraint Φ = Φf +Φm, the individual
shares can be written as:
Φm =
Φ + ∆
2
Φf =
Φ−∆
2
.
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Thus in log form
ln(Φm) = ln
(
Φ + ∆
2
)
= ln
(
Φ
(
1 +
∆
Φ
)/
2
)
(7)
ln(Φf ) = ln
(
Φ−∆
2
)
= ln
(
Φ
(
1− ∆
Φ
)/
2
)
. (8)
Let d = ∆
Φ
. The results of Kalugina et al. (2007) and Radtchenko (2007) show
that in the RLMS data the shares of two household members are usually of the
same order. Consequently d is likely relatively small and by Taylor expansion
we get
ln(Φm) = ln(Φ) + ln(1 + d)− ln(0.5) ≈ ln(Φ) + d− ln(0.5)
ln(Φf ) = ln(Φ) + ln(1− d)− ln(0.5) ≈ ln(Φ)− d− ln(0.5).
(9)
The individual shares Φm and Φf are defined by (7) and (8) in terms of Φ =
(wm + wf )T + y, and d which we specify below. Substituting (9) into (7) and
(8) the labour supply functions become 13
h∗m = αmD ln(wm) + βmD ln(wm)
2 + γmD(ln(Φ) + d) + qmD
h∗f = αfD ln(wf ) + βfD ln(wf )
2 + γfD(ln(Φ)− d) + qfD
(10)
3.3 Introducing Non-Participation
The continuity condition on the participation frontier applies to the labour
supply functions as well as the sharing rule. Indeed, the latter is intimately
related to the participation status of both spouses. Thus, given our specifica-
tion of the sharing rule, the continuity condition hinges upon d in (10) being
continuous as each spouse’s labour supply tends to zero. The following trans-
13 The constant terms qmD and qfD include (–ln(0.5)).
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formation of d insures continuity along the participation frontier:
d∗ =
 d+ rh
∗
f , if pm = 1 and pf = 0
d+Rh∗m, if pf = 1 and pm = 0,
(11)
where r and R are the parameters describing the continuity of the sharing rule
derivatives on the participation frontier. When one’s spouse is not working, the
labour supply functions become (upon substituting d∗ and regrouping terms):
hm =αmD ln(wmt) + βmD ln(wm)2 + γmD(ln(Φ) + d) + sh∗f + qmD,with pft = 0
hf =αfD ln(wft) + βfD ln(wf )2 + γfD(ln(Φ)− d) + Sh∗m + qfD, with pmt = 0,
where S and s are the parameters that insure the continuity of the labour
supply functions. The parameters r and R are related to s and S through
the following constraints: r = s/γmD , R = −S/γfD. The complete structural
collective model of household labour supply with corner solutions can be for-
mulated as follows:
hm =

αmD ln(wm) + βmD ln(wm)2 + γmD(ln(Φ) + d) + qmD, if pf = 1
αmD ln(wm) + βmD ln(wm)2 + γmD(ln(Φ) + d) + qmD+
s
(
αfD ln(wf ) + βfD ln(wf )2 + γfD(ln(Φ)− d) + qfD
)
, if pf = 0
(12)
hf =

αfD ln(wf ) + βfD ln(wf )2 + γfD(ln(Φ)− d) + qfD, if pm = 1
αfD ln(wf ) + βfD ln(wf )2 + γfD(ln(Φ)− d) + qfD+
S
(
αmD ln(wm) + βmD ln(wm)2 + γmD(ln(Φ) + d) + qmD
)
, if pm = 0
(13)
As with any endogenous tobit model, the issue of coherency must be addressed
[see Gourieroux (1980), Lacroix and Fortin (1992) and Fortin, Lacroix and
Villeval (2007)]. It can easily be shown that the coherency condition in our
model boils down to [see also Bloemem (2008)]:|sS| < 1. This condition needs
to be verified once the model is estimated.
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3.4 Sharing Rule Specification and Reduced-Form Model
Individual income shares are not observed in the data. Consequently, the
sharing-rule in (9) must be specified explicitely. Let d be made to depend upon
the log-wages [ln(wm), ln(wf ), ln(wm)
2, ln(wf )
2], and individual and household
characteristics (Xf , Xm, Xfm):
d = θX,
whereX = [ln(wm), ln(wf ), ln(wm)
2, ln(wf )
2, Xm, Xf , Xfm, 1] and θ = (θwm, θwf ,
θw2m, θw2m, θm, θf , θfm, θ0) is the vector of corresponding coefficients, including
a constant, θ0 (we omit indexing the parameters by D to ease reading). By
substituting d in the labour supply functions (12) we get:
h∗m =αm ln(wm) + βm ln(wm)
2 + (14)
γm
[
ln(Φ) + θwm ln(wm) + θwf ln(wf ) + θw2m ln(wm)2 + θw2f ln(wf )2+
θmXm + θfXf + θfmXfm + θ0] +
mXm +mfmXfm + cm
h∗f =αf ln(wf ) + βf ln(wf )
2 + (15)
γf
[
(ln(Φ)− θwm ln(wm)− θwf ln(wf )− θw2m ln(wm)2 − θw2f ln(wf )2−
θmXm − θfXf − θfmXfm − θ0] +
fXf + ffmXfm + cf
with
hm =
 h
∗
m, if pf = 1
h∗m + s · hf∗, if pf = 0
(16)
hf =
 h
∗
f , if pm = 1
h∗f + S · hm∗, if pm = 0
(17)
In their reduced-form, equations (15) and (16) are given by:
h∗m = a1 ln(wm) + a2 ln(wf ) + a3 ln(wm)
2 + a4 ln(wf )2 + a5 ln(Φ) + (18)
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a6Xm + a7Xf + a8Xfm + a0
h∗f = b1 ln(wm) + b2 ln(wf ) + b3 ln(wh)
2 + b4 ln(wf )2 + b5 ln(Φ) + (19)
b6Xm + b7Xf + b8Xfm + b0.
The structural parameters corresponding to the wage rates, the sharing-rule
and individual characteristics are all identified [see equations (5) and (6)]:
Husbands
αm = a1 + a5b1/b5
βm = a3 + a5b3/b5
γm = a5
m = a6 + a5b6/b5
θm = −b6/a5
θwm = −b1/b5
θw2m = −b3/b5
r = s/a5
Wives
αf = b1 + b5a2/a5
βf = b4 + b5a4/a5
γf = b5
f = b7 + b5a7/a5
θf = a7/a5
θwf = a2/a5
θw2f = a4/a5
R = −S/b5.
The marginal effects of the variables Xm and Xf on the sharing rule are given
by the parameters θm and −θf . The direct effects of the linear and quadratic
wage terms and the variables Xm and Xf on the spouses’ labour supply are
given by θwm,θw2m, αm, βm, m and θwf ,θw2f ,αm, βf , f , respectively.
The three constants of the structural model (θ0, cmD, cfD) are not identi-
fied, nor are the parameters corresponding to the household characteristics
θfm,mfmD, ffmD. In the latter case, the identification problem stems from the
fact that the household characteristics are determinants of the labour supply
of both spouses as well as the sharing rule. On the other hand, the identified
parameters allow us to compute the elasticities of the sharing rule with respect
to the wage rates:
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∂ ln Φm
∂ lnwj
=
∂ ln Φ
∂ lnwj
+
∂d
∂ lnwj
= T
wj
Φ
+ θwj + θw2j (20)
∂ ln Φf
∂ lnwj
=
∂ ln Φ
∂ lnwj
− ∂d
∂ lnwj
= T
wj
Φ
− θwj − θw2j . (21)
Because individual shares Φm and Φf are neither observed nor measured, the
marginal effects can only be calculated for arbitrary values of the household
income sharing, for example at half of the total income:
∂Φm
∂wj |Φm=Φf
=T
Φm
Φ
+ (θwj + θ2wj)
Φm
wj
=
1
2
(
T + (θwj + θ2wj)
Φ
wj
)
(22)
∂Φf
∂wj |Φm=Φf
=T
Φf
Φ
− (θwj + θ2wj) Φf
wj
=
1
2
(
T (θwj + θ2wj)
Φ
wj
)
. (23)
4 The Statistical Model
The model of the previous section focused entirely on the labour supply. In
particular, it assumes that wage rates are observed even in the event a spouse
is not working. We must thus specify a wage function for spouse j at time t: 14
lnwjt = zjtηj + δjDj + pij + ujt, (24)
where
D =
 1, if t ≥ 19980, if t < 1998. (25)
The equation states that the wage rates depend upon observed characteristics,
zjt, as well as time-invariant unobserved characteristics, pij, and a contempora-
14 We index the variables with t to underline the fact that the model is estimated
with panel data.
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neous shock, ujt. We also allow the wage function to shift in a discrete manner
between the pre and post 1998 periods through the parameter δj.
Let xjt be the vector of individual characteristics of the household mem-
ber j that proxies his/her preferences and which may also affect the sharing
rule. Furthermore, let νjt and λj represent unobserved heterogeneity variables
that are time-dependent and time-independent, respectively. The reduced-form
labour supply model can then be written as:
pjt = 1I (h
∗
jt > 0 )
h∗mt = aDxmt + νmt + λm + (1− pft)s · (bDxft + νft + λf )
h∗ft = bDxft + νft + λf + (1− pmt)S · (aDxmt + νmt + λm) (26)
hjt =
h
∗
jt if h
∗
jt ≥ 0, j = f,m
0 otherwise,
where aD and bD are the parameter vectors of the reduced forms (18) and (19),
respectively. 15
The contemporaneous error terms (umt, uft, νmt, νft) of the wage and labour
supply equations are assumed to have a joint normal distribution with mean
0 and covariance matrix Σuν :
Σuν =

σ21 σ12 σ13 0
σ12 σ
2
2 0 σ24
σ13 0 σ
2
3 σ34
0 σ24 σ34 σ
2
4

(27)
The error terms are thus assumed to be independent across households. As
in Bloemem (2008), we allow nonzero correlations between spouses’ labour
supply and wage equations. Each spouse’s labour supply function is further
15 Additive heterogeneity can be shown not to affect the identification of the sharing-
rule since the additive constant is not identified. See our remark relative to the
unidentified parameters on page 19.
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assumed to be correlated to his/her wage function. The zeros on the diagonal
reflect the fact that we do not allow the wage rate and the hours of work to be
correlated across spouses. Consequently, the covariance matrix of error terms
of the wage and labour supply equations in (26) is given by:
Σ
Ss
=

σ21 + s
∗2σ22 + 2s∗σ12 (1 + S∗s∗)σ12 + S∗σ21 + s∗σ22 σ13 0
(1 + S∗s∗)σ12 + S∗σ21 + s∗σ22 σ22 + S∗
2
σ21 + 2S
∗σ12 0 σ24
σ13 0 σ23 σ34
0 σ24 σ34 σ24
 ,
with S∗ = S(1 − pmt), s∗ = s(1 − pft) and pjt = 1I (h∗jt > 0 ). It should be
noted that S∗ and s∗ take zero or non zero values depending on the participa-
tion status of both partners. Thus, the covariance matrix differs according to
the four possible participation regimes (both partners work, one works, none
work).
The contemporaneous error terms (umt, uft, νmt, νft) are assumed to be in-
dependent of the individual random effects (pif ,pim,λf ,λm). Following Hoynes
(1996), and in the spirit of Heckman and Singer (1984), we assume that the
individual random effects follow a discrete distribution with a finite number
of realizations. 16 More precisely, we assume that the terms (pikm, λ
k
m, pi
k
′
f , λ
k
′
f )
occur with probability pk,k
′
, k, k′ = 1, . . . , K. There are thus K ×K possible
types of household configuration in the model.
16 We could in principle specify a standard random effects model. To be worthwhile,
such a specification would allow the random terms to be correlated across years.
Unfortunately, over half of our sample is only observed once (1040 out of 1953
households). We could also impose the random effects to be constant across years
as in Bloemem (2008). We deem preferable to use a parsimonious non-parametric
specification thus avoiding to turn to specific parametric distributions. Michaud
and Vermeulen (2006) have recently estimated a discrete-choice collective household
labour supply model in which unobserved heterogeneity is modelled in a similar
fashion.
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4.1 Likelihood Function
The complete model is defined by equations (24), (26) and (27). Because the
covariance matrix (27) is positive definite, it can be decomposed as follows:
Σuν = LL
′,
where L is a lower triangular (Cholesky) matrix. The constraints σ14 = 0 and
σ23 = 0 in Σuν translate into constraints on the parameters of the matrix L.
Indeed, since σ14 = l11l41 and σ23 = l21l31 + l22l32, it follows that l41 = 0 and
l32 = −l21l31/l22.
Naturally, we do not observe a wage rate for individuals who do not work.
We must therefore integrate over the whole domain to complete the likelihood
function. The conditional likelihood function is given by:
L ( ·;pikm, pik
′
f , λ
k
m, λ
k′
f ) =∏
pft=1
pmt=1
f4(umt, uft, νmt, νft;pikm, pi
k′
f , λ
k
m, λ
k′
f )×
∏
pft=1
pmt=0
−(aDxmt+λm)∫
−∞
f3(umt, νmt, νft + Sνmt;pikm, pi
k′
f , λ
k
m, λ
k′
f )dνmt ×
∏
pft=0
pmt=1
−(bDxft+λf )∫
−∞
f3(umt, νft, νmt + sνft;pikm, pi
k′
f , λ
k
m, λ
k′
f )dνft ×
∏
pft=0
pmt=0
bm∫
−∞
bf∫
−∞
f2(νmt + sνft, νft + Sνmt;pikm, pi
k′
f , λ
k
m, λ
k′
f )d(νmt + sνft)d(νft + Sνmt)
where the bounds bm, bf are defined as
bm =−(aDximt + λim + s · (bDxift + λif ))
bf =−(bDxift + λif + S · (aDximt + λim)),
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and where fr is the normal density function of dimension r. The unconditional
likelihood function is obtained by summing over the unobserved heterogeneity
components:
L =
K∑
k=1
K∑
k′=1
pk,k
′
L(·; pikm, pik
′
f , λ
k
m, λ
k′
f )
5 Results
5.1 Reduced-Form Parameters
The parameter estimates of the reduced-form model [equations (18) and (19)]
are presented in Tables 6–10. Table 6 focuses on the labour supply functions.
For each spouse, the parameter estimates are divided into two columns ac-
cording to whether D = 0 or D = 1. In general, the full-income variable has
a negative impact on labour supply, but is statistically significant only in the
husbands’ equation in the post-1998 period. An increase in the husbands’ wage
rate has a negative impact on their own labour supply in the pre-1998 period,
but a positive one in the post-1998 period, and no effect on the wives’ labour
supply. The wives’ wage rates, on the other hand, have no effect on either
labour supplies in both periods.
The second panel of the table reports the parameters estimates associated with
Xm, Xf , Xfm, respectively. According to the table, schooling has a positive
effect on weekly hours of work of both husbands and wives, and pre-schoolers
exert a negative impact on husbands’ hours of work. There are no statistical
differences between the pre and the post 1998 periods. The dummy variable
Post-1998 indicates that both husbands and wives have increased their labour
supply following the financial crisis of 1998. The parameter estimate aggregates
changes at the intensive and extensive margins, but is nevertheless consistent
with the results of Table 4 and the evidence presented in Figure 1.
The parameter estimates of the wage equations are reported in Table 7. 17
17 The wage equations include regional dummy variables that are absent from the
hours equations. This exclusion restriction is motivated by the fact that auxiliary
regressions has shown that once we condition on wages, there is little regional vari-
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The table shows that the wage rates decrease slightly with age and increase by
approximately 4% with an additional year of schooling. Such a rate of return
is certainly low by Western standards. Yet they coincide perfectly with those
reported in Cheidvaaser and Benitez-Silva (2007). 18 The table also shows
that wages vary considerably across regions for both husbands and wives. Not
surprisingly, wages are highest in the Moscow-St-Petersberg regions, and lowest
in the Volga and North Caucus regions. The dummy variable D captures any
shift that may have occurred in the wage functions in the post-1998 period
above and beyond those that are already controlled for in the regression. It
shows that both husbands and wives have benefited from increases of 11% and
5%, respectively. This is consistent with the results reported in Table 2 that
indicated that the husbands/wives wage ratios were increasing. Indeed, the
results presented in Table 2 were based on households in which both spouses
are working. In Table 7, on the other hand, the estimation includes husbands
and wives whose spouses do not work. It is thus conceivable that wives whose
husbands do not work are a self-selected group whose earning are larger than
the average. 19
Recall from equation (26) that both the labour supply equations and the wage
equations contain random effects and correlated error terms. The parameters
of the unobserved heterogeneity are presented in Table 8. The first two lines
of the table relate to the labour supply functions. 20 According to the pa-
rameter estimates, type 1 husbands have a stronger preference for work than
ation in weekly hours of work. On the other hand, children variables are included in
the hours regressions but not in the wage regressions.
18 The low rate of return was traditionally attributed to government “wage-
squeezing” policies. It was conjectured that the rate of return would increase as
Russia moved towards market democracy [see Brainerd (1998)]. Cheidvaaser and
Benitez-Silva (2007) attribute the low rate of return to education in post-cummunist
Russia to an excess supply of well-educated workers.
19 One could also argue the opposite: wives with inactive husbands are willing to
work at lower than average wage rates. While plausible, this situation is more likely
when husbands are involuntarily unemployed. In principle, there are no involuntarily
unemployed individuals in our sample.
20 The model is estimated with only two pairs (pikj , λ
k
j ). The data support up to
three pairs of parameters. Unfortunately, one of the pairs always has a very small
probability of realization. To avoid over-parameterizing the model, we focus on the
more parsimonious specification.
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type 2 while the converse holds for wives. The next two lines of the table re-
port the unobserved heterogeneity components of the wage equations. While
every parameter estimates are statistically significant, the null assumptions
H0 : ω
1
m = ω
2
m and H0 : ω
1
f = ω
2
f can not be rejected. Thus contrary to the
labour supply functions, unobserved heterogeneity appear not to be an impor-
tant factor in determining the wage rates of husbands and wives. Recall that
there are potentially four types of households in the data. Table 9 reports the
distribution of household types. By far the most common type corresponds to
(λ2m, λ
2
f ) and (ω
2
m, ω
2
f ). Other configurations occur with much smaller probabil-
ities (1.4%, 4.2% and 6.8%). One can thus conjecture that the control variables
are capturing a sizeable amount of individual heterogeneity so that there is
little room for unobserved heterogeneity parameters.
Finally, we report the parameter estimates of the covariance matrix (27) in
Table 10. The matrix Σuν captures the covariances between the contempo-
raneous error terms of the wage and labour supply equations. The estimates
indicate that the spouses’ wage rates are very weakly correlated with their
own labour supply (σumνm = 0.008 and σufνf = −0.007 ) and between them-
selves (σumuf = 0.011). On the other hand, their labour supply functions are
strongly correlated (σνmνf = 0.330). Taken as a whole, the parameter estimates
of the unobserved heterogeneity suggest that the households in our sample are
relatively homogeneous (only one important type ) and that there is little selec-
tion into employment that may be linked to unobservable characteristics that
simultaneously affect the wages and the hours of work. On the other hand, un-
observed shocks that may increase (or decrease) participation of both spouses
are strongly correlated. This suggests that factors that are not controlled for
in the hours equations affect spouses in a similar fashion.
5.2 Structural Parameters
The parameters of the structural model [equations (12) and (13)] are reported
in Tables 11. As in Kalugina et al. (2007) and Radtchenko (2007), we find a
negative relationship between own wage and labour supply (αfD < 0, αmD <
0). The negative relation between hours and wages is possibly due to the fact
that the latter are very low and the hours of work relatively high that the
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income effect dominates the substitution effect. 21 The parameter estimates of
γfD and γmD are negative and statistically significant in the post-1998 period
which suggests leisure is a normal good. The table also reports the parameters
associated with the wage rates in the sharing-rule. Finally, the labour supply
continuity parameters S and s easily verify the coherency condition of the
model (i.e. |sS| < 1). We comment below on the interpretation of the labour
supply and sharing-rule continuity parameters.
From the parameters of Table 11, a number of interesting statistics can be
computed. 22 First, recall from equations (20) and (21) that the elasticity of
each spouse’s share on income can be computed with respect to both wages
rates. These are reported in the top panel of Table 12. Bearing in mind that
not all are statistically significant, the table nevertheless reveals interesting
changes between the pre and post 1998 periods. To start with, a ten percentage
point increase in husbands’ wage rates increases their relative income share way
more in the aftermath of the financial crisis. According to the table, such a
change would have translated into a 5.2% increase before 1998 and by as much
as 9.2% after 1998. The same wage increase would have increased the wives’
share by 3.3% and 0.9%, respectively. This means that as the husbands’ wage
rates increased in the years that followed the economic downfall, they have
kept a greater share of the additional full income to themselves. Wives, on the
other hand, have behaved differently. The table shows that a 10 percentage
point increase in their wages translated into a 7.8% increase of their share
prior to 1998 and approximately 6.6% after 1998. Thus while both husbands
and wives do behave altruistically, wives in the post-crisis period seem to
transfer a greater share of family full-income than husbands do, contrary to
what prevailed in the pre-crisis period.
The next panel of the table presents the impact of a unit increase in each
21 Active husbands and wives in our sample work on average 44 and 40 hours per
week, respectively.
22 Most of these are highly non-linear functions of the structural parameters. So
while few of these are individually statistically significant, it may the case that
these non-linear functions turn out to be significant once the covariance between
the parameter estimates are taken into account. Furthermore, the elasticities in
Table 12 are intimately related to the parameters of the sharing-rule, i.e. γmD and
γfD. Unfortunately, non-labour or full-income parameters are rarely statistically
significant [see e.g. Fortin and Lacroix (1997)].
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spouse’s wage rate on their relative full-income assuming it is initially divided
into equal shares. The calculations are based upon equations (22) and (23).
These results are central to the paper but their validity depends on the as-
sumption of equal sharing holding true. A unit increase in the hourly wage
rate of a spouse automatically increases full-income by 168$ (T = 168 hours
per week). The table indicates that, prior to 1998, an increase in the husbands’
wage rates would have increased their share of the full-income by 102.73$ and
that of their wives by 65.27$. In the post 1998 period, an identical change
in their wage rates would have increased their share by 152.12$ and that of
the wives by only 15.87$. The marginal impact of an increase in wives’ hourly
wage rates is completely different. Indeed, prior to 1998 they would have kept
nearly all the increase in the family full-income to themselves (167.49$). In the
post 1998 period, they would have kept 125.98$ to themselves and transferred
42.02$ to their husbands. What these estimates suggest is that spouses do not
behave in an egotistic manner. An increase in their wage rates do increase their
share of the household income but not at the expense of their spouse. Both
benefit from the additional income. The estimates do suggest, however, that
in the post 1998 period, as the economic environment got better, husbands
became somewhat more egotistic and wives somewhat more altruistic.
The behavioural changes relative to the full-income sharing is bound to impact
the labour supply elasticities. To investigate this, we report two different types
of elasticities in Table 13. The top panel reports the own-wage elasticities
computed under the assumption that the sharing-rule in unaffected by the
increase in the wage rate. 23 The elasticities reported in the bottom panel
account for the additional income effects accruing from changes in the sharing
of the full-income. The results of the top panel indicate the elasticities are
relatively constant across periods for both husbands and wives. Once again the
results relative to the husbands are relatively more precise. The bottom panel
tells a different story. First, the impact of a marginal increase in the husbands’
wage rates on their labour supply increases from -0.05 to -0.20 between the pre
and post crisis periods. This is essentially due to the fact that husbands transfer
less income to their spouse in the post-1998 period. Likewise, an increase in the
wives’ wage rates has a negative impact on their husbands’ labour supply in
the post-1998 period. This is a consequence of transferring them more income
than was previously the case. As a matter of fact, the estimates suggest that
23 Recall that the spouse’s wage rate intervene only through the sharing-rule.
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in the pre-1998 period (bottom line) wive’s wage rates had no impact on their
husbands labour supply precisely because they essentially kept the additional
full-income to themselves. Finally, the table shows that the wives labour supply
elasticities are generally negative (although not statistically significant) once
the sharing-rule is accounted for. This follows from the fact that an increase
in their own wage rate, or that of their husbands, translates into an increase
in their full-income.
The above elasticities are derived under the assumption that both spouses
work. Recall from equations (11), (12) and (13) that the labour supply func-
tions and the sharing-rule change according to the participation status of each
spouse. The continuity parameters are presented in Table 11. The labor supply
continuity parameters S and s insure the statistical coherency of the model
with four participation regimes but also underline the importance of taking
into account the participation status of each spouse on the own-wage elastic-
ity of their labour supply. For example, given that husbands have a negative
own-wage elasticity and wives have a negative own-share elasticity, a positive
value of s implies that if wives stop working then the elasticity of husbands’
labour supply with respect to their wage will increase. This effect occurs via
income transfers from husbands to their wives. The same reasoning applies,
mutatis mutandis to wives through the parameter S. Likewise, a change in
the participation status of one of the spouse in the post-1998 crisis influences
the manner in which the household full-income is distributed. For example,
given that husbands have a negative own-wage elasticity, a positive value of
R implies that if they were to stop working then the elasticity of their in-
come share with respect to their own wage would decrease [see equation (11)].
Likewise, because r < 0 if wives were to stop working their elasticity would
also decrease. These results highlight the importance of taking into account
the participation status of each spouse because the intra-household income
distribution is intimately related to it.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the evolution of the intra-household income allocation
among Russian households over a period of significant economic turmoil. The
main thrust behind the paper is the recognition that the important changes
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in the economic and institutional environment that have occurred in Russia
over the 1994–2004 period may have triggered important behavioural changes.
Adaptation to the major economic downturn of 1994–1998 and to the eventual
recovery of 2000–2004 may indeed have brought spouses to a new economic
equilibrium. We first document these changes by looking at the evolution of the
participation rates and the spouses’ relative wages using data from the Russian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. Surely, the most impressive change relates to
the dramatic decline in the wage rates, and primarily that of male workers in
the year 1998. In the years that followed, male workers have managed to regain
some of the loss more rapidly than their spouses. Thus not only did the gender
wage gap increase during the 2000–2004 period, but so did the intra-household
wage gap.
It is thus important to assess how such changes may have impacted the intra-
household distribution of welfare within Russian households. Fortunately, if
one is willing to assume that the households behave in a Pareto-efficicient
manner, then it is possible to focus on labour market outcomes to indirectly
infer the impact of the changing economic environment on individual welfare.
We propose a model that is inspired from the works of Bloemem (2008) and
Donni (2003). The model assumes Pareto-efficient outcomes and admits both
interior and corner solutions on working hours. Wage rates and the labour sup-
ply functions are estimated simultaneously. The main novelty of the empirical
model is to allow the parameters of the sharing-rule to change in a discrete
manner between the pre and post 1998 periods.
The main empirical result of the paper suggests that spouses behave in an
altruistic manner. An increase in the husband or wife’s wage rate benefits
both spouses. On the other hand, we find that in the 2000–2004 period, as
the economy got better, husbands have become more egotistic and wives more
altruistic: An increase in their relative wage translates into a smaller/larger
transfer to their spouse.
This paper attempts to investigate the impact of the enormous shocks the
Russian economy has gone through on individual welfare. Given the nature of
our results, further research is certainly warranted. We acknowledge that the
empirical and theoretical analyses rest on relatively strong assumptions. Chief
among these is the implicit assumption that households are only composed
of two decision makers. The recent literature suggest that adult children and
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elderly parents may also have a say on the decision process. Because Russian
households typically include elderly parents, this issue should be accounted for
in future research. Furthermore, the empirical model could be refined to allow
greater intertemporal interdependence of intra-household decisions. Dynamic
collective models are still in their inception but are surely pertinent for the
type of problem we investigate in this paper. The important changes that
have occurred on the Russian labour market over the last 15 years and the
availability of quality data offer an excellent basis to develop and validate the
collective models in numerous directions.
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Table 6
Reduced-Form Parameter Estimates of the Labor Supply Functions
hj/100
Husbands Wives
D = 0 D = 1 D = 0 D = 1
Wages and Income Variables
ln Φ 0.021 -0.059 -0.027 -0.022
(0.025) (0.033) (0.024) (0.031)
lnwm -0.041 0.060 0.006 0.025
(0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019)
lnwf -0.009 0.019 0.007 0.009
(0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018)
(lnwm)2 -0.004 0.010 0.002 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
(lnwf )2 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observable Characteristics
Age 0.033 -0.010 0.075 -0.050
(0.028) (0.036) (0.037) (0.045)
Schooling 0.020 -0.021 0.021 -0.020
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012)
# Children (0–6) -0.030 0.034 -0.019 -0.011
(0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
# Children (7–18) -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Post 1998 (D = 1) 0.113 0.094
(0.049) (0.049)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7
Parameter Estimates of the Wage Equations
Husbands Wives
Observable characteristics
Age/10 -1.204 -4.516
(1.613) (0.672)
Age2/100 1.527 5.249
(2.117) (0.827)
Schooling/10 0.372 0.319
(0.061) (0.057)
Region of residence
Moscow-St-Petersberg 0.353 0.641
(0.078) (0.076)
North/Northwestern 0.197 0.317
(0.084) (0.081)
Central/Black Sea -0.114 -0.073
(0.074) (0.068)
Volga/Viask/Bolga Basin -0.365 -0.234
(0.074) (0.072)
North Caucus -0.384 -0.324
(0.082) (0.078)
Ural -0.117 -0.097
(0.081) (0.073)
Western Siberia 0.087 0.248
(0.086) (0.076)
Eastern Siberia (Omitted) – –
Post 1998 (D = 1) 0.112 0.045
(0.040) (0.038)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 8
Unobserved Heterogeneity Parameters
Parameter Husbands Wives
Labour Supply Equations
λ1 0.728 0.163
(0.040) (0.040)
λ2 0.327 0.368
(0.039) (0.038)
Wage Equations
ω1 -1.169 -0.345
(0.314) (0.171)
ω2 -1.038 -0.500
(0.311) (0.152)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 9
Discrete Probability Distribution
Wives Husbands
marginal
probabilities
1 2
1 0.014 0.042 0.056
(0.004) (0.005)
Husbands
2 0.068 0.877 0.955
(0.010) (0.010)
Wives marginal 0.082 0.919 1.000
probability
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 10
Cholesky Matrix of: Σuν
uimt uift νimt νift
uimt 0.125
(0.001)
uift 0.087 0.078
(0.002) (0.001)
νimt 0.067 * 0.939
(0.034) (0.013)
νift – -0.094 0.344 0.840
(0.045) (0.018) (0.011)
Covariance Matrix: Σuν
uimt uift νimt νift
uimt 0.016 0.011 0.008 0
uift 0.011 0.014 0 -0.007
νimt 0.008 0 0.892 0.330
νift 0 -0.007 0.330 0.833
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Chol32 = −Chol21 ∗ Chol31/Chol22
– Constrained to zero
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Table 11
Parameters of the Structural Model
Husbands Wives
Variables Parameters D = 0 D = 1 D = 0 D = 1
ln(Own-Wage) αm, αf -3.863 -3.483 1.718 4.353
(2.137) (2.348) (2.332) (3.114)
ln(Own-Wage)2 βm, βf -0.498 0.729 0.238 0.433
(0.360) (0.641) (0.293) (0.497)
ln(Own-Share) γm, γf 2.068 -3.862 -2.718 -4.889
(2.536) (2.122) (2.420) (1.944)
Sharing-Rule(d) D = 0 D = 1
ln(wm) θwm 0.220 0.628
(0.392) (0.107)
ln(wf ) θwf -0.417 -0.263
(0.316) (0.192)
ln(wm)2 θw2m 0.073 0.143
(0.129) (0.063)
ln(wf )2 θw2f -0.014 -0.024
(0.120) (0.046)
Labour Supply
Continuity Parameters
s 0.018
(0.014)
S 0.019
(0.011)
Sharing-Rule
Continuity Parameters
r 0.009 -0.005
(0.013) (0.003)
R 0.007 0.004
(0.006) (0.002)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 12
Elasticities of the Sharing-Rule (On the Participation
Frontier)
Husbands Wives
D = 0 D = 1 D = 0 D = 1
∂ ln Φj/∂ lnwm 0.521 0.927 0.331 0.097
(0.492) (0.102) (0.491) (0.101)
∂ ln Φj/∂ lnwf 0.002 0.220 0.783 0.659
(0.289) (0.159) (0.288) (0.160)
∂Φj/∂wm 102.730 152.125 65.270 15.875
(96.981) (16.558) (96.981) (16.558)
∂Φj/∂wf 0.511 42.023 167.489 125.977
(61.723) (30.498) (61.723) (30.498)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 13
Labour Supply Elasticities
Husbands Wives
Constant Sharing-Rule (Φ)
D = 0 D = 1 D = 0 D = 1
∂ lnhm/∂ lnwm -0.079 -0.114
(0.044) (0.049)
∂ lnhf/∂ lnwf 0.030 0.085
(0.051) (0.066)
Variable Sharing-Rule (Φ)
∂ lnhj/∂ lnwm -0.051 -0.204 -0.021 -0.011
(0.049) (0.076) (0.017) (0.010)
∂ lnhj/∂ lnwf 0.000 -0.090 -0.020 0.008
(0.016) (0.053) (0.018) (0.056)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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